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LAKE VICTORIA'S 
NILE PERCH FISH INDUSTRY: 
THE POLITICS OF JOINT ACTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Kenyan exports of Nile Perch (NP) from Lake Victoria 
reached US$ 27.4 million in 1995. The exports have 
been made possible by a seemingly inexhaustible 
demand for fish in developed countries and a cluster o f 
fishermen, traders and processors in Kenya ready to 
bring the fish to market. 
The cluster is an odd mix of urban based fish 
processing factories, artisanal fishermen and rural 
traders. For the industry to prosper, this group needs t o 
work separately and together to ensure that every s t age 
of the process - from the lake to the consumer's plate -
happens without a hitch. Studies of other 
geographically based clusters suggest that the key to 
success lies in collective efficiency generated by the 
interactions in the group. This paper attempts to 
explore some of those interactions and their effects. 
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Most of the empirical material presented in this paper 
comes from fieldwork in two places: Uhanya, one of 
the main fishing communities on the Kenyan shore of 
Lake Victoria and Kisumu, where most of the export 
processors are clustered. Section 1 of this paper is 
contextual and gives a brief introduction to the fish 
industry in Kenya. It shows the overall dimension of 
the industry, how it is organised and existing 
transaction regimes in Uhanya. In addition, it outlines 
the conceptual framework for understanding the politics 
of joint action. Section 2 discusses Uhanya cluster 
emphasising the role of fishing, cooperative society, 
agents and traders to the development of the cluster. 
Section 3 discusses the large scale fish processors and 
their link with Uhanya, while section 4 analyses the 
two challenges facing the cluster. The chapter also 
reflects on the theory of collective efficiency in Lake 
Victoria fish processing; whereas the concluding 
chapter provides lessons for collective efficiency. 
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SECTION 1: FISH INDUSTRY IN KENYA 
The global fishing industry began to expand after the 
second world war and has now become an important 
industry due to the growth in demand. The industry is 
characterised by heterogeneity of organisational forms 
and diversity of activities and actors. It is dominated 
by industrial or semi-industrial firms thriving alongside 
small scale harvesting, processing and marketing 
activities. According to ILO (1988), there are about 15 
million fishermen in the entire world among which 
small scale (artisanal) accounts for between 13 and 14 
million. Secondary activities and associated industries 
provide employment to between 26 and 28 million 
people. 
In many developing countries of Asia and Africa, fish 
accounts for more than 50% of total animal protein 
intake. In Africa, small scale artisanal fishing makes up 
84% of total catch (Willman, 1983). The industry 
mostly uses dug-out canoes operated by sail and 
paddle. The sector is organised in clusters. It is labour 
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intensive, applying simple methods and techniques, 
which are continuously being improved (Platteau 
1989). Rising living levels in both developed and 
developing countries and the high income elasticities 
have aroused huge demands for fish products, resulting 
in commercialisation of the industry and the gradual 
transformation and subordination of the traditional 
management systems. 
In Kenya, fishing is an important economic activity. It 
provides both employment and income to a large 
percentage of the local communities. Over the last 
fifteen years the aggregate landings of fish from inland 
waters have increased. Landings from Lake Victoria 
alone account for about 98 per cent of production from 
Kenya inland lakes, and account for about 93 per cent 
of all the fish landed (Kenya 1997). Some fish is sold 
fresh while a significant proportion is processed by fish 
processors for later consumption. Some processing is 
done by Small Scale Fish Processors (SSFP), while 
other, notably freezing and packaging for export, is 
undertaken by Large Scale Fish Processors (LSFP). 
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1.1 Size and characteristics of industry 
The Kenyan small scale fishing industry has been active 
for centuries. Its intensive incorporation since 1980 into 
the large scale capitalist fishing production and 
processing has not stifled the industry. Artisanal fishing 
and trade go on within and around all the waters in 
Kenya. In 1980 a total of 48,218 metric tonnes of fish 
and crustaceans valued at 316,902 million shillings were 
landed by 41,796 fishermen using 12,637 fishing vessels 
throughout the country (GOK, 1993). By 1995 the total 
value of metric tons of fish landed increased to 5,204,309 
billion shillings (Kenya 1995). Among the sources Lake 
Victoria had the highest percentage of catch (table 1.1). 
Other sources include: coastal and deep sea fisheries, 
[mainly restricted to the coast] and fish farming where 
fish is raised in artificial ponds and dams scattered 
around the country. 
5 
9 
000, 'MS)! aniBA 
91tf'Z0l *39 Z'LS n o ' e s oxe't7 q a r a j ajiK 
888'I81 101*581 68£'88 P\6'9Z 
ssuaqsi j 
68Z.'£6[ 2LL'\0Z ez,6'soi q s i j jbjoi 
£66 [ 0661 §861 0861 sauuojL Dujapv 
[sauuox aujapvi ui] s§uipuurj qsi^ :x*X siq^X 
< I r "OK* Til >f+r" 
61S ° N dAVSQl 
IDS/WP No 519 
Total (market) 316,902 311,770 7,231,820 5,204,309 
Lake Victoria 58,805 190,550 1,532,964 4,678,140 
Nile Perch 
(fishermen) 
7,434 92,290 687,167* 3,315,503 
* Figures for 1991 
Source: Compiled f rom Various Annual Statistical Bulletins, Fisheries Department , Statistics Section 
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Small scale fisheries around Lake Victoria are highly 
segmented. Within the industry, there are fishermen, 
crewmen, traders and middlemen. Fishing is mainly done 
by men of all ages with primary level education (Ogutu 
1988; FAO 1992). They use rudimentary tools and gear, 
with most owning only one boat. On the other hand, 
women engage in local processing and trading, with a 
few trading beyond the locality and district. Majority are 
poor and invest in the fish trade due to its low capital 
requirement. 
The LSFP mainly export fish to Europe, Middle East, 
Australia and Japan. Few others export to U.S.A. In 1995 
a total of 12,052 metric tonnes of fish and related 
products were exported earning Kenya Ksh. 1,492 billion 
in foreign exchange (Kenya 1995). In 1996 one of the 
major processors exported fish to European Union (EU) 
valued at Ksh. 519,626 million while exports to Israel 
were 4,109 million and Japan 5,004 million (Danner 
1997). 
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Social classes are becoming distinct within the fishing 
industry. On the one hand are artisanal fishermen and 
fish processors as well as small scale fish traders, on the 
other hand, are entrepreneur seasoned fishermen with 
advanced technology, LSFP and progressive traders. The 
first group rely on rudimentary technology and operate 
on very low capital; while the second group have 
advanced technology, adequate capital and are able to 
manipulate the first group. 
1.2 Commercialisation of Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Commercialisation of the fish industry at Lake Victoria 
began with the influx of people to various beaches in 
response to increased fishing activities. The introduction 
and maturation of the Nile Perch ('lates Niloticus), 
improved fishing technology and the subsequent opening 
of the export market attracted seasoned fishermen and 
traders into fish trade. Most beaches realised an increase 
in the number of fishermen, boats and traders (O'Riordan 
1996). Trawling, although currently outlawed was also 
going on during the initial stages of commercialisation. 
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The availability of Nile Perch (NP) for export since the 
mid eighties has transformed Lake Victoria Fisheries 
from a local into an international resource. The effect of 
the boom has been reflected in the increasing number of 
fishermen in the corresponding years. In 1979 there were 
only 16,000 fishermen on the Kenyan shores of the lake 
and by 1993 the number had increased to 82,300 (Kenya 
1994). Most of these fishermen are entrepreneurs and not 
'actual fishermen'. They hire fishing crew and managers 
with fishing knowledge to fish for them. 
The opening of the global market and increased Nile 
Perch catch accompanied with establishment of 
processing factories has been positive to fisheries of Lake 
Victoria. It has given rise to a number of actors, 
including LSFP coming to the beaches with refrigerated 
trucks to collect fish using agents. Different types of 
traders exist with some doubling up as agents of LSFP. 
The latter have been actively involved in the processing 
of fish. 
10 
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In total there are twenty two fish processing firms in 
Kenya located mainly around the lake shore. Originally 
they were mostly based in Nairobi and Mombasa. The 
increase of fish requirement and the opening of the 
foreign market has pushed a number of firms to relocate 
on the shores of Lake Victoria (Abila and Jansen 1997, 
October) with majority in Kisumu. All of them are export 
oriented, contribute to employment generation and earn 
the government foreign exchange (Greboval, 1992). 
The commercialisation of the Nile Perch is taking place 
as artisanal fishermen, fish processors and small scale 
traders, continue operating as they always have. In the 
process the artisanal fishermen are exploited by the well-
to-do LSFP through their agents and middle persons. 
They are compelled by the economic situation to enter 
into a patron - client relationship with the large scale 
commercial entrepreneurs. Agents of large scale fish 
processors make all sorts of arrangement with the 
fishermen, including; credit relationship, supply of gear 
and purchase of fish in the lake from special transport 
vessels among others (Jansen 1997). 
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The availability of NP for export has triggered 
competition for fish and the artisanal fishermen using 
rudimentary technology can not effectively compete. 
Although commercial fishing is important as a foreign 
exchange earner and employment generation, processing 
factories set up in connection with export oriented fish 
industry have in various ways undermined traditional 
management systems (Jansen, 1995). It has transformed 
both the position of artisanal fishermen and small scale 
community based fish processors around the lake. The 
stiff competition for raw Nile Perch has pushed most 
small fish traders to deep frying mgongo wazi (bare fish 
skeleton) and deep frying, smoking and sun drying 'baby 
perch'. 
Commercial fishing needs large investment capital which 
most artisanal fishermen cannot afford. Most fishing 
enterprises are plagued by problems facing small micro 
enterprises elsewhere in Kenya. They lack finance, 
infrastructure and effective organisation. The reluctance 
of commercial banks to extend credit to ordinary 
fishermen, reduces their ability to compete (Ogutu 1988). 
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Cooperatives which are weak are viewed as possible 
alternative. Informal credit for supplies by traders and 
middlemen which is dominant in Asia is marginal within 
the fishing clusters of lake Victoria. In Asia, the 
middlemen provide informal loan and other benefits with 
one obligation of the fisherman to sell all their catch to 
the trader to whom they are indebted (Merhjin, 1989). 
1.3 The Cluster 
A cluster is a group of producers making the same or 
similar things in close proximity to each other (Schmitz 
1995). The entire Kenyan part of Lake Victoria fish 
cluster includes about 65 fishing beaches scattered in six 
districts within Nyanza province. This research, however, 
covers what we believe to be a representative segment of 
that cluster: 'Uhanya-LSFP Cluster,1. The cluster includes 
LSFP at the lake and in urban centres, and fishing, 
trading and related activities at a single feeder beach. 
Uhanya beach is located in Usigu division, in Siaya 
District. It has a population of about 4,000, including 
13 
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1,500 fishermen and is one of the m; or beac -
(Mitullah 1996) of Lake Victoria. Residents of U 
are engaged in fishing and multiplicity cv relate 
activities, including fish processing, fi.-'.i trade 
retailing of consumer products. These attributes provide 
a good seed bed for assessing the existing transaction 
regimes in the context of the fish industry. From timi 
time this paper discusses one of die componer :s c i ' . 
cluster separately. 
1.4 Transaction Regimes 
The cluster has several different market channels 
transaction regimes for full-size' and under-size perch 
which are summarised into the four main regimes shown 
in figure 1. 
( 
1 Full-size Nile Perch weigh above one 
a half kilogrammes and are the only one:3 
purchased by large scale fish processors. 
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The four regimes are different but related and all except 
the fourth regime are linked to the final destination of 
fish (processing factories, national and export markets) 
through agents and purchasers. 
First Regime consists of both Kenyan and Ugandan 
fishermen who fish both in Kenyan and Ugandan waters. 
They use the Kenyan fish traders as middle persons for 
their fish. Once fish is purchased by traders, it is taken to 
the cooperative shed2 where it is directly marketed to 
LSFP through their agents. The agents purchase fish in 
close collaboration with purchasers of LSFP who 
accompany the refrigerated trucks. Once purchased, the 
fish is loaded into insulated trucks to large factories for 
2 There is a parallel newly constructed 
modern fish landing which is only used by one 
progressive trader, who is an agent of three 
LSFP. All the fish this trader collects from 
several beaches including Uganda islands by pass 
the cooperative shed and land on a new shed built 
to EU required standards. The LSFP dealing with 
the trader collect the fish for further 
transportation to the factories. 
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processing. Subsequently fish is processed, frozen or 
chilled and exported to foreign markets. 
Second Regime is equivalent to the first regime except 
for the final destination which is domestic retailers. 
Third Regime has both Kenyan and Ugandan fishermen 
selling their fish directly to the cooperative shed, where 
it is purchased by medium scale traders using small 
trucks and pickups. The fish is delivered to hotels, 
restaurants and markets in major urban centres such as 
Kisumu, Nakuru and Nairobi. 
Fourth Regime is composed of Kenya fishermen and 
traders who sell both under-size and fish rejected by 
LSFP to small scale processors (SSP), without 
necessarily going through the cooperative shed. 
Occasionally, some agents do 'small time' business o f 
buying 'rejects' at the shed and selling to the Small Scale 
Processors (SSP). The processors use various methods, 
including smoking, frying and drying for processing 
before selling their product to both small and medium 
1 8 
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scale fish traders. This fish is sold within the region 
(div ision, district, province) and other provinces such as 
Western, Nairobi and Coast. 
Although all the above regimes are important to Uhanya, 
this paper limits itself only to the first and second 
regimes. These two regimes are related, interact with 
other regimes and also link up with both national and 
international trade. They therefore provide a good ground 
for analysing the politics of joint action. 
1.5 Conceptual Framework 
The promotion of individual efforts embedded largely in 
small scale enterprises has become a key development 
agenda. Debates revolve around the performance of small 
scale enterprises and the different methods of improving 
their performance. Clustering and collective efficiency 
notions have been advanced as routes for understanding 
and fostering efficiency and performance of small scale 
enterprises through collective action (Schmitz, 1989). The 
notion owes its origin to Alfred Marshall's theory of 
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'externalities', which focus not on a firm's internal 
organisation but on the general development of industry 
including, the importance of location and the potential for 
efficiency among small firms. These are reflected in 
labour pooling, development of specialised local supplies 
and services, and technology spillovers (Marshall 1890; 
Schmitz 1997). 
Collective efficiency theory states that under certain 
circumstances, clusters of enterprises give rise to the 
division of labour and specialization among small 
producers, the emergence of suppliers, agents, technical 
and financial service providers, and ultimately a pool of 
skilled wage workers (Schmitz, 1995). It is further 
argued that collective efficiency by facilitating the 
industrialization process, can lead to the creation of jobs 
and higher incomes for many people in developing 
countries (McCormick et al 1996). 
External economies and joint action are the two prongs 
of the theory of collective efficiency. Detailed discussion 
of main economic variables of collective efficiency has 
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been covered elsewhere (McCormick 1998; Mitullah 
1998). Joint action is of particular interest to this paper. 
External economies are important to growth, but are not 
sufficient to ride out major changes in product or factor 
markef These require joint action (Schmitz 1995; 1997). 
What is often not clear, however, is what promotes or 
prevents joint action. This paper views both economic 
and political factors as important in the analysis of joint 
action. However, so far economic has been the only 
aspect treated. 
When analysing clusters it is necessary to assess the 
benefits and costs of joint action. The hypothesis that the 
small size of product market, the net effects of disabling 
external economies, and the high cost of effective joint 
action have prevented African clusters from developing 
beyond low level operation (McCormick 1997) needs a 
critical look. Applying Schmitz's theory of collective 
efficiency and the idea of responding to opportunities, 
and crisis by shifting 'gears' from passive to active 
collective efficiency (Schmitz 1997), one can argue that 
clusters based on petty commodity trade and services 
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except in isolated cases have not exploited the potential 
of joint action. 
The social and political implications of joint action have 
to be assessed and appropriately tapped. This can be done 
by applying interest group theory, derived from pluralist 
conception of society. Interest group analysis is important 
in processes that involve decisions of who gets what, 
when, and how. In this process of interest group politics 
one interest group bears the cost of action and another 
receives the benefits. 
There is need to understand what draws individuals and 
enterprises into cooperating or taking joint action as well 
as what prevents them from doing so. For one to take 
joint action there has to be ajeeling of inadequacy in one 
way_or the other. To this extent, any entrepreneur who 
decides to combine forces with other entrepreneurs or 
firms expects some gain based on shared interest. 
However, two faces of power characterise politics of 
interest groups. One is manifested overtly in the decision 
making process, and the other is evident in the capacity 
22 
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of powerful individuals and groups to prevent issues that 
threaten their interest from arising (Chilcote 1981). 
Institutions are important for individuals and interest 
groups. They provide grounds for interaction, carving 
alliances and forums for addressing issues which can not 
be handled by individual entrepreneurs and/or firms. 
However, most clusters in Africa, either lack relevant 
institutions and/or have weak ones. This makes it 
difficult to exploit the benefits of collective efficiency 
through cooperation. The existing associations are largely 
informal and address welfare issues. Few of them also 
engage in advocacy, advice/information and training 
activities, savings and loans and joint market activities 
(Haan 1995). Although these institutions come up 'from 
within', a distinction can be made between a 'top-down' 
and "bottom up' approach. The latter is viewed as 
important for growth. It enables a group of micro and 
small enterprises to take joint action in facing a particular 
problem (Haan 1995). 
23 
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Institutions be they formal or informal are important as 
a guide to human interaction. They affect the 
performance of the economy by their effect on the costs 
of exchange and production (North 1990). In applying 
the theory of collective efficiency, the state at local level 
and sectoral associations can play a pivotal role in 
fostering and assisting clusters. This is more needed 
during early stages of industrialisation (Nadvi and 
Schmitz 1994). Reflecting on African clusters which are 
struggling to industrialise, the case for working 
institutions including focused state support is warranted. 
Considering the fact that both state and sectoral 
associations are necessary for the growth of clusters, the 
fate of African clusters remains murky. Since the mid 
eighties, most African governments have been pressurised 
into taking a backstage role in development activities. 
This exposes existing weak institutions which have all 
along relied on the ineffective state for direction and 
support, to uncertainties. The only way out for such 
institutions may lie in taking active joint action in order 
24 
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to transform existing weak institutions into working 
business and social organs. 
Above all. this section notes that whereas joint action 
may be positive to business, caution has to be taken on 
its effect on individual entrepreneur's morale. Most 
enterprises in Africa are still small and revolve around 
the individual sole proprietors. As reflected in the Nadvi 
and Schmitz's typology (Nadvi and Schmitz 1994) some 
of these businesses are basically for subsistence, and the 
role and vision of the individual entrepreneur may be 
more important than investing in joint action. 
SECTION 2: UIIANYA CLUSTER 
2.1 Brief History 
Uhanya beach is as old as Lake Victoria. However, 
Uhanya cluster owes its origin to the beginning of the 
1980s when the NP business started transforming the fish 
industry around Lake Victoria. Prior to this, Uhanya was 
no different from any other beach dominated by artisanal 
25 
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fishermen and processors struggling to make a living 
with hardly any markets beyond the beach and 
surrounding area. The fishermen used rudimentary 
techniques including reed traps, papyrus beach 'seines' 
and sisal long lines. These methods controlled the 
exploitation of the resource, since fish was largely for 
consumption with a little for limited markets. 
The development of Uhanya cluster has to be understood 
within the broader context of Lake Victoria fisheries. By 
1963 there was only one shop by the beach and local 
fishermen were catching tilapia (oreochromis 
lencostictus) and other local species such as catfish 
(bcigrus docmac, locally referred to as sew) and elephant 
Snout Fish (mormyrus kannume locally referred to as 
suma). The arrival of sardine (rastrineobola argentea, 
locally referred to as omena) traders from Kisumu who 
had been operating in Luanda Kotieno (a beach in 
another location) in 1977 marked the beginning of a key 
turning point in Uhanya. Their arrival in addition to early 
resident artisanal processors activities realised the 
marketing of dried fish beyond Uhanya and surrounding 
26 
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regions. This further opened the market and increased 
competition. These factors intensified business efforts and 
provided an unplanned preparation for the intervention of 
LSFP. 
The intervention of LSFP due to the boom during the 
mid eighties marked a major turning point for Uhanya. 
The beach began to change drastically as the LSFP and 
medium scale fish traders from Kisumu, Nairobi and 
other major urban centres travelled to Uhanya for the 
great NP. These economic forces gradually transformed 
Uhanya and by 1995, Uhanya had become an active rural 
center with a number of urban characteristics. It had a 
total of 710 residential units, 2 bars, 15 hotels including 
food kiosks, 6 tailoring shops and a total of 50 lodging 
rooms. There are also numerous itinerant traders, trading 
in diverse consumer goods. The population of Uhanya 
ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 depending on the season. 
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2.2 Services and Infrastructure 
Fishermen and traders in Uhanya operate within an 
environment lacking most infrastructure and services. 
Except for an access road and a telephone booth, 
infrastructure and other services are lacking. The beach 
has no electricity, banking, financial, postal and health 
facilities. 
Sanitary services are either lacking or are very poor. 
Most structures within the beach have no toilets and all 
residents rely on untreated water from the Lake. 
Residents bathe, wash clothes and draw water for 
household use from same spots. This contributes to 
pollution and prevalence of diseases related to poor 
sanitation and water quality. For postal and health 
facilities residents have to rely on services available four 
kilometres away in Usenge, whereas nearest banking 
facility is loeated twenty five kilometres away. Few 
NGOs provide credit to entrepreneurs within Uhanya. 
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One public telephone booth installed before the survey 
services the entire population. This, in addition to the 
Fisheries Department Radio Call are the only airwaves 
communication available. The residents are cooperative 
in using the public telephone booth. This facility has 
improved communication between Uhanya and the rest of 
the country. Traders are able to make business contacts 
with both customers and external supplies of business 
requirement. 
Plans for electrical power supply to the division were in 
an advanced stage3. A community project estimated to 
cost a total of Ksh. 80 million, is expected to provide 
electricity to key centers and institutions within the 
division. The project is expected to have two phases; a 
main line and a phase consisting of three feeder lines. 
With Uhanya being a third priority, it will take a while 
before it has electricity. 
3 Interview with District Officer, 
Usigu division. 
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2.3 Fishing in Uhanya 
Fishing enterprises in Uhanya are small and 
undercapitalised. Their owner managers are, like most 
small-scale enterprises, most concerned with the short-
term goal of earning sufficient income to cover their 
families' basic needs. 
Most fishermen (73.3%) operate on full time basis while 
only 23.3 per cent combine fishing with other activities. 
Employees in fishing enterprises were mainly males and 
their number ranged between 2 and 15 with only 16.7% 
having no employees. Those who did not have employees 
operated their enterprises with assistance of relatives and 
family members. Firms had more assistants ranging 
between 1 and 15 with majority (70%) having between 
1 and 5 assistants. A total of 63% of the firms noted that 
they had difficulty finding good assistance, 36.7% did 
not have any problems. Most firms noted that the number 
of workers had increased. Another 43.3% had 
experienced a decrease with 3.3% indicating that the 
numbers had remained the same. 
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Almost all fishermen use non motorised boats. The few 
entrepreneurs who had motorised boats were mainly 
traders collecting fish from other beaches and Ugandan 
Islands. During the survey, the total number of boats at 
site was 97, while average landing per day was 52 
boats4. 
Fishermen rely on capital from their own sources ranging 
from Ksh. 10,000 to 150,000 with a mean of 45,100. 
Own sources were dominated by income from business, 
previous employment and farming respectively. No 
fisherman had borrowed from private banks, development 
banks, special government sponsored credit lines or 
NGOs. Instead they relied on informal money lenders, 
friends and cooperatives. However, 43.3 per cent had 
attempted to get credit. The credit was required both for 
working capital and investment. 
4 Discussion with fisheries 
officers based in Uhanya. 
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Sincc beginning operations, fishermen in Uhanya have 
been exposed to a number of changes. While business 
and income have increased, the quantity of catch has 
reduced. The reduced catch is reflected in reduced sizes 
of NP, increased demand for fish and intense competition 
among the actors. Whereas the increase of business and 
income has attracted more businesses as demonstrated by 
the increase in boats, LSFP, number of fishermen, 
maintenance cost of boats, it has also contributed to the 
seasonal changes in number of fishermen. 
Fishing of under-size fish is a major problem in Uhanya 
and greatly contributes to depletion of fish. However, it 
did not come out in the survey. Only two fishermen 
indicated that they specialise in under-size NP with four 
others indicating that they specialise in both under-size 
and other types of fish. Participant observation at the 
beach showed extensive processing and trade in under 
size 'baby perch'. This was supported by key informant 
interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). 
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Apart from fishing, the cluster is dominated by fish 
processing and fish trade. Most trade activities are small, 
run by owners and were largely started during the 1990s 
as a response to the NP boom and intervention of LSFP. 
Since the boom most traders have worked continuously 
in the fish industry. The cluster has a number of 
enterprises which rely on and service the fish industry. 
Trade is dominated by both large and small scale fish 
traders and processors. The LSFP have advanced 
processing technology, they purchase fish in Uhanya and 
transport it to Kisumu and other major towns for 
processing. On the other hand, the SSP largely rely on 
purchase of 'rejects5 ' and illegal under-size NP. 
2.4 The Knot: LSFP and Trade in Uhanya 
The cooperative, traders and agents are the main actors 
in Uhanya. They provide the link with LSFP who in turn 
5 'Rejects' are Nile perch which do not 
pass the quality test of large scale fish 
processors. Ordinarily they are safe for 
immediate consumption and processing. 
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link Uhanya with both the national and international 
market. Apart from the cooperative which is meant to 
provide a forum for joint action, the other actors operate 
individually. The LSFP have developed networks with 
traders and agents. These networks are largely of benefit 
to traders, agents and the LSFP. The artisanal fishermen 
who have been the source of trade and life of Uhanya are 
gradually being sidelined. The fishermen's umbrella 
organisation, YFCS is not effective and does not seem to 
provide any benefits; whereas the traders and agents are 
aggressive and seem to be taking a good share of 
business as discussed below. 
2.4.1 Agents and Traders 
The movement of fish from Uhanya beach to the 
processing plants depends on the work of traders and 
agents. The agents and fish traders bring fish from 
several landing beaches, including Ugandan islands, to 
central points accessible to insulated trucks for loading to 
the factories. Factories also take fish directly through 
fishermen cooperatives. There are two types of agents: 
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company and independent agents. Company agents are 
contracted by the company to supply wet fish. In most of 
the cases the agents supply mainly one LSFP and in 
some exceptional cases, for example a progressive 
entrepreneur or agent may supply more than one LSFP. 
Independent agents sell fish to factories without any 
binding agreement. 
A number of agents have learnt to survive in the game 
and are able to change customers whenever they wish, 
including when they have been provided with benefits. 
Some of the agents have become good traders owning 
their own boats and engines, while others merely rely on 
collecting fish at landing from fishermen. Another lot of 
agents combine their own efforts of collecting fish with 
buying from other traders and fishermen; while the last 
lot go a step further and forge formal links with 
fishermen by supplying them with nets and fishing gear 
on loan. 
Most progressive traders are agents of LSFP. The key 
difference between a trader and an agent is their 
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beginning point. Most agents begin their operations as 
hired employees of LSFP or medium scale fish traders, 
whereas traders start off as entrepreneurs, buying and 
selling fish. In the process of employment some agents 
begin running their parallel business and eventually 
become trader/agent. Agents who do not run parallel 
businesses work in close collaboration with traders and 
fishermen. 
The LSFP rely on traders and agents for the supply of 
fish and have to keep the relations good, in order to 
ensure steady supply of fish and also keep their 
employment. The LSFP prefer to have agents who have 
good relations with traders and fishermen and are at the 
same time influential. The agents keep the LSFP 
informed of the activities of the beach including the 
going prices for fish. 
The price for a kilogramme of fish paid to agents is 
different from that paid to ordinary small scale traders 
and fishermen. The latter get lower prices with 
differences being as wide as over fifteen shillings per 
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kilogramme of fish. Besides, their fish is only purchased 
after those of the agents have been taken. During high 
seasons they get stranded with fish and are highly 
manipulated by agents and purchasers. 
Progressive fish traders have become the middle persons 
between the LSFP and the Fishermen. They buy fish 
cheaply from fishermen in several beaches including 
Ugandan islands and land them in Uhanya ready for the 
LSFP. Few factories have begun renting their own 
vessels, including trawlers6 and hiring their own crew in 
order to get enough fish. This undermines fishermen's 
and other small traders opportunities of being vertically 
integrated (Jansen 1997, September) into the supply 
chain. However, one progressive trader was found to be 
vertically integrated into the supply chain. 
6 Trawling is illegal within the 
Kenyan waters, but influential 
individuals, including some LSFP are 
known to be trawling. 
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The progressive trader/agent (Box 1) had 8 registered 
motorised boats and was collecting fish as far as 
Ugandan islands. Another study has indicated a total of 
30 boats for the entrepreneur (Abila and Jensen 1997, 
October). It is possible that some of the boats are not 
officially registered, although they operate within the 
beach. Agents, like this entrepreneur, earn good amount 
of commission and have more steady prices than the 
fishermen and traders who arc not agents. 
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Business in Uhanya depends on progressive fresh fish 
traders, agents and LSFP who collect fish for 
transportation to factories. These interest groups dominate 
business and have formal arrangements among 
themselves. This gives them an upper hand in local 
business, as opposed to local fishermen and SSFP. The 
three interest groups are able to effectively trade even 
during high season when the market is flooded and the 
LSFP rely only on their agents for fish. 
2.4.2 The Cooperative 
YFCS is the main association for fishermen. It is an 
umbrella body for all fishermen and 90 per cent of the 
fishermen interviewed belonged to the association. The 
cooperative has been in existence since 1968 when it had 
only 54 members. In 1996 the cooperative had a total of 
1,000 members, but only 580 were active during the 
survey. The society also has a full time management 
secretariat with a total of 30 salaried employees, 
including fish landing and sale clcrks (recorders). The 
cooperative draws its revenue from commissions on sale 
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of fish, two shops selling fishing gear and parking fees 
from trucks loading fish. The cooperative equally shares 
the parking fee with Uhanya beach organization7. The 
cooperative manages a total of nine beaches and Uhanya 
is the main beach for the society in terms of size, fish 
landings and income. 
A number of difficulties were being experienced by the 
society, the major one being that of middlemen working 
as agents of the large scale fish processors dominating 
the fish trade and determining prices. Agents are 
important to the large scale fish processors who have to 
compete for the available fish. The agents understand the 
local dynamics of business and are able to easily interact 
with fishermen and other traders. The cooperative 
attributes the dominance of agents and large scale fish 
processors to the lack of cold storage facilities at the 
' Beach Organisation is a 
management organ for the entire beach 
residents. It ensures that the 
operations of the beach are running and 
the welfare and social affairs of the 
beach are catered for through community 
efforts. 
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bcach. This makes the cooperative unable to control 
members and other actors as far as sale and pricing is 
concerned. 
The fishermen did not seem to appreciate any activities 
of the organisation. They noted that the society was not 
supportive and could hardly provide any assistance, even 
basic fishing gears such as nets. The society was also 
accused of not bothering about pricing, wrong fishing 
gears, future plans for fishermen and the insecurity in the 
lake. Instead they were concerned about the daily 
commission on fish landings. The cooperative earns a 
commission of fifty Kenyan cents for one kilogramme 
of fish. During high season the society earns between 
Ksh. 60,000 and 100,000 and between Ksh. 50,000 and 
60,000 during low season. Most of these funds are spent 
on monthly payment of staff and membership bonuses 
every end of year. 
Key informant interviews showed that the cooperative 
had attempted to deal with the issue of pricing but was 
unsuccessful, and did not pursue the issue any further. 
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The issue of fish pricing is political and the LSFP use all 
their influence to ensure that the prices remain at an 
acceptable level to them. At one point their lobbying 
reversed an increase of prices which the cooperative had 
achieved from the government. 
Fishermen who did not belong to the cooperative pointed 
out that they were not impressed by its activities and did 
not see the benefits of belonging to the association. A 
probe on the role of the cooperative as far as price 
setting and .quality control is_cflnce_med showed hardly 
any role. A total of 95.5 per cent of respondents 
indicating that the cooperative played no role in price 
setting, while another 89.5 per cent indicated that they 
played no role in quality control. However, they were 
noted to be playing some role in retailing fishing gear 
(65%), taking commission on sales (25%) as well as 
giving dividends and bonus to members (10%). 
The FGD confirmed the negative attitude fishermen held 
for the cooperative. It was noted that fishermen were 
disillusioned with the society, did not see its benefits nor 
did they care what was going on within it. Most 
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fishermen indicated that the association did not provide 
any support. Notwithstanding, the cooperative officials 
conceptualised fishermen as difficult individuals noting 
that 'gero janam tekV (developing a fisherman is 
difficult). Cases of fishermen selling fishing gears bought 
through credit were cited as indications of their 
problematic nature. 
It was further revealed during the FGDs that Uhanya 
fishermen who were disillusioned with YFCS had 
attempted to form a parallel organisation (Uhanya 
Fishermen Organisation/group) which was thwarted by 
both YFCS and other government authorities. Fishermen 
in Uhanya registered an organisation in 1993 and started 
remitting their commission to the group instead of YFCS. 
This became political and the officials of YFCS liaised 
with the District Commissioner who ordered that all the 
commissions be given to YFCS. By this time the group 
had accumulated Ksh. 100.000 which was still in their 
account during the survey. 
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SECTION 3: LARGE SCALE LAKE VICTORIA 
FISH PROCESSORS 
Fish processing industries around the lake shore date 
back to the mid eighties. Almost all of them, except three 
that had just begun operations in Kisumu started 
operating during the NP boom of the mid eighties. In 
total, there are fifteen registered factories around the 
Kenyan lake shore but only twelve were in operation 
during 1997 (Abila and Jansen 1997). Most of the 
factories process NP while a few also fillet tilapia for 
both foreign and domestic market. 
The NP has several products, the main one being fillet, 
comprising 30 - 35 per cent of body weight of medium 
size NP. Some factories which export to countries that 
require comparatively low quality, extract 35 to 50 per 
cent. The by products of the NP include; swim bladder 
(maws), frames (skeleton), fat, skins and trimmings. 
Among the by-products, the frame has been popular as a 
domestic dish. However, extraction of fillet up to 50 per 
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cent has affected its quality for human consumption and 
a high percentage goes to fishmeal factories. 
3.1 Ownership 
The factories are largely owned by members of the Asian 
community, some of whom are Kenyan citizens. Eight of 
the 12 operating factories are owned by people of Asian 
origin as sole owners or in partnership with people of 
other nationalities (Abila and Jansen 1997). The few 
African entrepreneurs who have ventured into processing 
seem not to be doing well. During the survey, one of the 
most modern factories owned by a group of African 
partners was under receivership. Another owned and 
managed by a group of Africans who had previous work 
experience in other processing factories, including the 
one under receivership, was just beginning operations, 
wiiiie a innu one was struggling to survive in business. 
Interview with the African entrepreneurs revealed the 
closed nature of the processing business and the 
importance of having right foreign contacts for 
marketing. 
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3.2 Production Capacity and Fish Supply 
All the factories interviewed were running below their 
production capacity. Whereas their production capacities 
ranged between 10 and 75 tonnes of whole NP per day, 
majority were producing below 10 tonnes per day with 
the highest producing between 10 and 12 tonnes a day. 
Other research has shown that fish factories in Kenya can 
process up to 380 tonnes of fish per day but only 200 
tonnes of fish per day are processed (Abila & Jansen 
1997, October). 
Reason for operating below capacity was given as 
inadequate fish supply. Some factories indicated that 
during low season they have to close their factories, 
whereas others noted that they get additional fish from 
their sister companies in Uganda and Tanzania. One 
factor contributing to smaller fish supplies is the lack of 
cold storage facilities on the boats and at the beaches, 
which leads to rejection and wastage of fish caught. 
Another possible reason which was not mentioned by the 
processors is related to fish quality for export market, 
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especially for fresh chilled fillets. They require very high 
processing and quality control standards, including 
appropriate storage before freighting abroad. Any lapse 
of the process can lead to lose of millions of shillings 
and possible ban on exporting to the destined market. 
3.3 Competition 
Competition among the large scale fish processors is 
intense. They compete both for scarce fish supplies and 
for lucratic foreign markets. For them to survive the 
competition they have to develop good relations with 
actors at the beaches. In order to ensure fish supply, 
LSFP provide assistance to their agents and fishermen's 
cooperatives in different forms. Assistance to agents and 
fishermen include: credit, ice, fish containers and in some 
cases transport. The amount of support provided is 
largely mutual and based on the trust the two partners 
develop. Some processors noted that there are cases when 
they are disappointed with the agents but can hardly take 
any serious action, except breaking the relationship. 
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The progressive trader/agent was supplying three LSFP 
but most of the processors did not seem to have clear 
understanding of the entrepreneur's activities beyond 
their dealings. Whereas one LSFP commended him for 
having built a modern banda, another boasted of having 
constructed a banda in close collaboration with the 
entrepreneur. 
LSFP prefer to deal with agents as opposed to 
fishermen's cooperatives. Most LSFP view the 
cooperative as a threat to their business and it has been 
alleged that they have played a role in making 
cooperatives not work. Strong cooperatives are able to 
negotiate prices and also deliver fish to the factories, 
thereby reducing the number of middle persons. The 
inability of fishermen through the existing cooperative to 
preserve fish due to lack of cold storage has been 
exploited by LSFP. The latter collect fish by insulated 
trucks on their own terms. Since fish is a perishable 
commodity, most traders and fishermen have their hands 
tied and have to sell fish at a price dictated by the LSFP 
and their agents 
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Each LSFP seemed to have its own network of foreign 
contacts. There was not a lot of evidence of competition 
among them. There is however, intense global 
competition. Kenya fish competes with jjshJxonLEurope 
and Asia among others.^ The key factor in this 
competition is quality. Fears about quality of Kenyan Fish 
have led to two crises in the industry in the past year. 
The issue of market was enough to bring the usually 
suspicious and isolated LSFP together. 
Unlike Tanzania, where LSFP have associations, the 
Kenyan LSFP do not have any association and largely 
keep off each other. Interviews with LSFP showed the 
secretiveness embedded in the fish trade. One processor 
noted that 'each Firm wants to keep its secrets and make 
profits in their own way'; another observed that jealousy 
keeps processors apart with many bringing down others -
no true friendship - no trust'! According to a number of 
processors, the EU ban on Lake Victoria fish and a 
follow up of EEC inspectors made processors relate to 
each other. This was a relationship triggered by shock 
and worry of what to do with the huge investments, 
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which could no longer operate due to the ban. It is still 
too early to judge whether this will eventually lead to 
having an organ for joint action for the processors' 
cluster and fish industry in general. 
Discussions with LSFP revealed extensive reliance on 
agents for information about other processors. One 
processor observed that, whenever he wants to know the 
going prices he confides in his purchasers and agents. In 
exceptional cases, he may call a fellow processor, whom 
he relates with beyond business to ask about details of 
the market, more specifically pricing. The same processor 
noted that whenever his supply of fish dwindles, he gets 
on alert since possibilities are that other processors could 
be paying more. He gave examples where fellow 
processors lie about the actual amount they are paying 
for wet fish, only for the cheated colleagues to discover 
too late when they have nothing to process. 
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SECTION 4: A CLUSTER UNDER CHALLENGE 
The Lake Victoria fish industry has faced two major 
crises in recent years. Responses of key actors have been 
different in each case, but it is our contention that, in 
both, the eventual 'solution' depended as much on 
political as economic variables. 
4.1 Challenge No. 1: Falling Fish Supplies 
Falling fish supplies has been an issue in the Lake 
Victoria fisheries since the early twentieth century. The 
colonial government addressed the issue using several 
methods: improved technology of catching fish (Okedi 
1995), enforcement of regulatory measures and 
introduction of exotic species to complement existing 
stock (Andersen, 1961; Fryer, 1960). The latter resulted 
in the introduction of NP, viewed as a response to both 
the failure of improved fishing methods and enforcement 
of regulatory measures Ghcb notes that, 'unable to find 
practical solutions to the regulatory crisis the lake faced, 
the colonial authorities turned to considering the 
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possibility of complementing existing fish stocks with 
introduced fish species in desperate attempt to prevent a 
total collapse of the fishery\Gheb 1997:68). 
The NP Boom of the mid eighties cannot be isolated 
from external global forces. Apart from the maturation of 
the NP and the opening of foreign markets, the boom 
also coincided with the demand for quality fish and 
sufficient purchase capacity for fish in the world market 
(Jansen, 1996). The demand was greatly influenced by 
the .depletion of fish n ^ U j x e s j j i l h e north and the desire 
of the south to earn some foreign exchange. Ten years 
later, the south also begun realising the depletion of fish 
resources. 
In recent years a number of reasons have been given for 
the diminishing catch. They include: overfishing, illegal 
fishing gears including trawlers which destroy nursery 
grounds, the Nile Perch poaching on most small fishes, 
and water hyacinjji weeds spreading and interfering with 
water system. It is not possible to isolate the contribution 
of each of the variables to the diminishing fish catch. 
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Instead we examine how the actors involved have 
responded to the issue. 
4.1.1 Responses to Falling fish Supplies 
Three different responses to falling fish supplies can be 
identified. First, small scale fishermen, especially those 
with access to motorised boats began going deep into the 
lake and to Uganda to buy fish. They essentially turned 
into traders. Second, many small scale fishermen without 
motorised boats turned to catching under-size perch. 
Finally, the LSFP, as already mentioned, tried to ensure 
adequate supplies by drawing on their Tanzanian and/or 
Ugandan supplies and by strengthening their ties with 
those Kenyan agents who were performing well. 
Progressive Traders' Response 
Progressive traders responded to the diminishing fish 
supply by travelling all the way to Ugandan islands and 
several other Kenyan beaches to purchase and deliver fish 
to LSFP at the beach. This entails having motorised boats 
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and having a good crew with good contacts at the sources 
of fish supply. Additionally, due to tight enforcement and 
restriction of Kenyan boats into Ugandan waters, traders 
who take such trips must have relevant networks and 
adequate resources, including those for bribing Ugandan 
authorities. During the survey, only the progressive trader 
had his boats going to Ugandan on a daily basis, whereas 
the other two traders only made occasional trips. 
Non Motorised Fishermen's Response 
Most local fishermen are not motorized and are therefore 
not able to go fishing into the deep waters or collect fish 
far from the beach. Instead, they rely on luck of catching 
any type and size of fish from nearby fishing sites. The 
scarcity of full size NP within the Kenyan waters has 
further complicated the local fishermen's and processors' 
case. In order to make ends meet, these fishermen have 
been pushed into combining both good and bad fishing 
methods. The result has been going against the fishing 
regulations which condemns catching under-size fish. 
They have to fish late in the night and sell their products 
before sunrise, otherwise they risk being apprehended by 
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the fisheries officers; should the officials decide to do 
their work and not take chai (bribe). 
The reliance of both local fishermen and fish processors 
on under-size NP is a threat to the operations of the 
cluster. The survival of the two groups has been 
dependent on the inability of fisheries officials to enforce 
fishing regulations, an outcome thought to be influenced 
by the officers partisan position. Fisheries officials are 
known to own boats and trade in all types of fish 
including fishing and selling under-size fish. This makes 
them relax or ignore a number of fishing regulations, as 
demonstrated by the very fact that all along the beach 
one can see 'baby' perch being openly sun dried, deep 
fried and smoked. 
A probe into fishing regulations during FGDs confirmed 
the partisan nature of fisheries officials and their 
exposure to manipulation. The fishermen normally 
organise a small delegation with 'chaV to talk to fisheries 
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officials during 'closed season8 '. Whereas one may argue 
that the fishermen are either ignorant of what their action 
amounts to, or are stuck to traditional belief that fish 
cannot be depleted, the fact that local fishermen and 
processors largely rely on their trade as the only source 
of employment and income has to be given serious 
consideration. 
LSFP Response 
The LSFP have not addressed the issue of the 
diminishing fish supply, instead they have responded by 
expanding their catchment area into Tanzania and 
Uganda. The two countries have been observed to have 
better record of enforcing fishing regulations. 
Observation of Uhanya fish landing showed bigger sizes 
of fish coming from Uganda with those coming from 
Kenyan waters largely being under-size. This may partly 
imply that the LSFP are assured of adequate supply of 
fish from the neighbouring two countries, and are not 
'Closed season' is a restricted period of 
fishing, when fishing is not supposed to be 
undertaken in specific breeding areas. 
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bothered about the reducing stock in Kenya. Further, a 
large percentage of fish landed in Uhanya comes from 
Uganda. 
The inability to address the challenge of dwindling fish 
supply is partly clue to the different interests involved and 
their different coping mechanisms. It seems that so long 
as each interest group is able to satisfy its interest, 
however temporary, there is no issue cutting across to 
bring actors together. Additionally, for example in the 
case of the cooperative, officials also have their personal 
interests to protect. Another shortcoming in addressing 
the falling fish supplies, is the absence or mis-focused 
role of the stale as reflected in the behaviour of fisheries 
officials. 
4.2 Challenge No 2: European Union Quality Control 
Shock 
Quality control is key in any food industry. The Nile 
Perch boom flourished for over ten years without any 
quality problem, until January 1997 when salmonella was 
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found in fish exported to Europe. This caused a shock in 
the fish industry, resulting in a further turning point in 
Uhanya. According to one of the lead processors, in . 
January' 1997 one Ugandan firmexported fish infected ^ 
with salmonella to Spain and twojxrople died.^ 
The presence of salmonella in fish resulted in Spain 
imposing a ban on NP from East Africa to their market. 
France, Portugal, and Italy followed prompting European 
Union (EU) to impose the ban to cover all its member 
countries. This ban affected trade as was reflected in the 
drop of price of Nile Perch from Ksh 50 per kg in 
November 1996 to about Ksh 25 per kg in february 1997 
(Abila and Jensen. 1997:17 October). By October 1996 
price range was 45 - 60 per kg depending on whether 
one had an agreement with a processor or not. Those 
with formal arrangement like the progressive entrepreneur 
got the highest price. This price did not" include the 
agent/purchaser manipulated prices which were as low as 
between 20 - 30. 
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4.2.1 Responses to EU Quality Control Shock 
The EU ban on fish triggered a critical look on quality of 
fish from East Africa. The European Union responded by 
sending inspectors to the three countries to inspect 
handling and processing of fish from point of capture to 
the market. The mission revealed the unsanitary 
conditions and poor handling of fish at the beaches. They 
lalso noted the poor disposal methods of fish skeletons 
and meat trimmings and the sub-standard factory 
Conditions. 
Their recommendations demanded action by all 
concerned parties including governments of the three 
countries. Each country selling fish to the EU was 
required to have one competent authority which approves 
all fish processors. Required conditions for processing 
fish for EU market were also outlined, giving prominence 
to ISO 9000 standards and other quality standards. In 
order to ensure quality processing firms were required to 
dispose fish frames (skeletons) from factory immediately 
by selling them to fish meal plants in order to keep the 
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plants clean. In cases of sale to small traders, the 
requirement was that they be sold elsewhere out of the 
factory. 
Prior to the inspection most processors were disposing 
the frames and pieces of remaining meat by selling to 
small scale traders within the factories. Most of them 
bought in small quantities, and occasionally factories 
were unable to immediately dispose them. This was 
viewed by the inspectors to be a possible source of 
contamination of fillets for export. 
Another requirement was that fish caught should be 
immediately cooled in ice-boxes and fish should not 
touch ground. This requirement had a direct impact 011 
most beaches including Uhanya cluster. Our survey of 
Uhanya cluster had showed poor fish handling (Mitullah 
1997) with a high percentage of 'rejects'. Like other 
beaches, Uhanya lacks sanitary facilities and before the 
EU inspectors came in June 1997, fish handling was 
pathetic - merely being dragged on the ground and 
carelessly thrown into the insulated trucks. 
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Response to EU Shock by LSFP 
The ban almost killed the fish processing industry since 
the EU is one of the major markets for NP from East 
Africa. Although some LSFP took individual initiatives 
to visit their customers and reassure them of the safety 
of their products, individual action could not save the 
industry. One of the lead LSFP noted that the whole 
industry had suffered irrespective of whether any given 
firm had ensured quality or not. This is because EU 
viewed fresh water fish coming from East Africa as 
coming from one source, regardless of country or firm. 
Any quality failure by any single firm exporting to EU 
would affect all firms, even those with ISO 9000 
certification. 
At the level of processors, the shock of EU ban and 
subsequent presence of EU inspectors partly contributed 
to opening door for information sharing among the 
LSFP. Each processor was keen on knowing what type 
of requirements is expected by the inspectors and 
whether their factories would be targeted for inspection. 
For the processors whose markets were affected there 
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was a lot of running around and collaboration with 
relevant health authorities. Other processors whose 
markets were not directly affected, or had options of 
finding other markets, did not take any serious action. 
Apart from consulting each on what action to take in 
response to the HU shock, a number of LSFP struggled 
to ensure that the factory conditions were acceptable. 
This process begun with a re-examination of the handling 
of skeletons and the small pieces of remaining meat at 
the factory level. Prior to the shock, many firms left the 
skeletons and pieces of remaining meat lying inside the 
factory for long periods. In some cases they would be 
around the factory for days, either awaiting collection or 
simply ignored. This was found unacceptable by the EU 
inspectors, and strict requirements were recommended. 
In response to the recommendation on the handling of the 
skeletons and pieces of meat, many factories opted to 
have contracts with fish meal firms. This option was 
taken because the fish meal firms are able to take the by 
products in bulk as opposed to the small scale traders 
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who purchase small quantities. This option reduces the 
chances of having the by-products lying within the 
factories. Some firms sell the by-products away from the 
factory, mainly in Obunga9, while few others sell to 
small traders outside the factories. The latter is thought 
to be acceptable, because most factories have built large 
and high concrete walls around the factories. 
Other response at the factory level have included putting 
in place well equipped laboratories, modern fish filleting 
plants acceptable to the EU and engaging foreign 
technical assistance to ensure that the required standards 
are met. Other factories which are doing comparatively 
well had to send some of their personnel to get the 
9 Obunga is a cluster for artisanal 
processing of NP skeletons and pieces 
of meat from the LSFP. It has over 500 
hundred individual entrepreneurs 
processing and selling fish. Should the 
factories decide to deal only with the 
fish meal firms, as is increasingly 
becoming apparent, the whole cluster 
would be no more. 
64 
IDSAVP No. 519 
details of the requirements and also lobby their foreign 
market counter-parts. These efforts resulted in some 
factories achieving even higher standards (for example 
Nordic standards) than those required by the EU (Jansen 
1997). 
The response to the EU requirements did not stop at the 
factory level. Processors were also required to ensure that 
the sourcing of fish is appropriate and quality 
requirements are followed. In order to ensure this a 
number of processors have obtained their own fast-going 
transport boats with refrigeration facilities. Other 
processors support their agents to own the right 
equipment and supply them with ice. Since the EU 
requirements began to be strictly followed less fish is 
going to waste and the factory conditions have improved. 
Improved handling at the beaches is expected to reduce 
the reject rate to about 5 per cent. Previously the LSFP 
were rejecting over 25 per cent of fish delivered for 
processing. 
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Intense competition gave way to co-operation in the face 
of an external threat. Individual LSFP had to temporary 
put aside their secretive business behaviour in order to 
address a problem threatening the survival of the 
industry. Apart from co-operating among themselves, 
they also had to lobby government and design strategies 
of supporting and working with actors located within the 
beaches. 
Uhanya Cluster Response to EU Shock 
The processors soon found that the EU inspectors were 
not only interested in the factories but also the source of 
Fish, especially aspects related to handling and sanitation 
at the beach. The key to the action to save the Uhanya 
cluster was the alhance_between_J^ trader 
and one of the large scale processors. Seeing the looming 
doom to their trade, they came together to make 
consultations with government Ministries and 
Departments and constructed a modern well equipped 
banda. 
The modern banda is loeated right at the landing and has 
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relevant sanitation facilities, including a small generator 
pumping water from the lake into a reservoir tank, where 
it is treated with chlorine. The banda consists of a well 
constructed open shade with an attached office and toilet. 
It has white tables and chairs and it is way above the 
banda used by the cooperative society and the one 
previously used by the progressive entrepreneur. On 
landing, fish is immediately cleaned and chlorinated 
using water from the reservoir tank. Fish is then weighed 
and loaded into insulated trucks. The whole exercise of 
landing, cleaning, weighing and loading fish is 
undertaken by uniformed clean personnel, and takes less 
than three minutes. 
Uhanya cluster was lucky to have a progressive trader 
with capacity to respond to the shock. The trader has 
alliances with three LSFP, whom he satisfactorily 
provides with fish. Previously he had worked with other 
processors who had their own story to tell about him. It 
was also interesting to note that although lie was dealing 
with three LSFP, each thought he was 'theirs' and did 
not seem to know much about his dealings with other 
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processors. The trader plays his cards well, and scoops 
gains from each LSFP, depending on his interest. 
Interview with LSFP indicated that prior to the response 
of the trader Uhanya beach had very poor quality fish 
and some processors had stopped getting fish from the 
cluster. On the other hand, LSFP who were dealing with 
the trader noted that the entrepreneur was hard working 
and had improved business within the cluster. Most of 
them were supplying the trader with ice, containers, 
transport and other benefits. 
This was not the first lime the trader in collaboration 
with some LSFP had attempted to address the issue of 
quality. Prior to Eli quality shock, the trader had 
constructed a landing board which was comparatively 
better than the one managed by the cooperative and 
acceptable to the LSFP he was dealing with. Flowever, 
this was not acceptable to the YFCS, and the trader had 
to use his political contacts to ensure that the shed was 
not pulled down. 
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4.3 Collective Efficiency in Lake Victoria Fish 
Industry 
As indicated at the beginning of this paper, geographic 
clustering of enterprises is expected to bring with it 
certain benefits that can be lumped under the heading of 
'collective efficiency'. The benefits arise partly from 
external economies and partly from joint action taken by 
the cluster's participants. The general analysis of this 
particular cluster has revealed that, at the level of Uhanya 
beach, the main benefit to those in the cluster is access 
to foreign and national markets through the LSFP 
(Mitullah 1998; McCormick 1998). The analysis further 
suggests that, while this benefit was at first the result of 
passive external economies, maintaining it in the face of 
the recent challenges depends on effective joint action 
(McCormick 1998) 
In the case of EU shock, joint action took place and 
catastrophe was avoided. However, the mechanisms for 
joint action were not institutionalised, so the actors may 
need to begin all over again when the next crisis comes. 
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The LSFP have no organ for addressing issues affecting 
the industry and they are more concerned about their own 
Firms than about the cluster as a whole.. Each individual 
firm relates and lobbies fellow LSFP(s), actors at the 
beach, government officers and any other relevant 
individuals and institutions, the way they deem beneficial 
to their firms. This introvert approach has contributed to 
the inability to handle aspects which are negative to the 
development of the industry such as diminishing fish 
stock, sanitation along the beaches and the insecurity in 
the lake. 
The challenge of dwindling fish supply has not given rise 
to effective joint action. As discussed in section 4.1 all 
the actors who should address the issue, are evading it 
and taking alternative options, including further depletion 
of the resource. In order to understand the failure to 
address this challenge, the role of the various interest 
groups have to be appreciated. Of particular concern is 
the fisheries officials partisan position. They are unable 
to enforce fishing regulations since they are known to 
own boats and trade in all types of fish including fishing 
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and selling under-size perch. This makes them relax or 
ignore a number of fishing regulations. 
SECTION 5: LESSONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
EFFICIENCY 
The analysis in this paper raises issues not well handled 
by theory of collective efficiency: 'general interest vs 
competing interests: unequal power relations and 
interplay of social and economic gains. 
There are a number of interest groups within Uhanya, all 
of which have their specific interests to pursue and 
protect. Collective efficiency assumes that enterprises are 
capable of tapping the 'general interest' in the name of 
economic gains. However, any form of collective action 
is predicted by different modes and patterns of 
organisation within the social system that will either need 
to be harnessed or in some way overcome if a new 
associational form is to develop (Lowe 1986). 
A problematic aspect of collective efficiency in political 
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analysis is the subordination of individual interest. For an 
individual to opt for a collectivity there have to be gains 
beyond their individual interest. In the case of Uhanya 
there are a number of gains beyond individual enterprises 
and entrepreneurs and yet there are no effective 
collectivities. One explanation could lie in what is viewed 
for example by fishermen as personal gains by leaders of 
the cooperative society. 
The non motorised fishermen who are among the most 
exploited in the trade process, and they have a lot to gain 
in a collectivity. Forming a cooperatives is generally 
viewed as a positive approach of addressing jssues such 
as dgpletjorwind pricing of fish, securit^jn^the lake, 
sanitation along and within the beach and possible 
availabi I i t y j ) f j x ) l d s to r a^ . These are aspects which cut 
across and can not be addressed by individual fishermen. 
The cooperative has hardly addressed any of these issues, 
thereby raising questions on the benefits of membership 
in a collectivity. 
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The jjnequal power relations are reflected in the 
fishermen's attempt to harness economic gains by 
forming a parallel association and the struggle of the 
YFCS to ensure that the association does not take off. 
The fishermen had identified their economic interests and 
the gains entailed in forming a parallel association. This 
was in response to the failure of the existing cooperative 
society, but neither the leaders of the existing YFCS nor 
LSFP could allow it. Their intention was perceived as a 
competing interest which had to be quelled. 
In response, all possible manipulative moves were taken 
to ensure that the parallel cooperative does not come up. 
This included seeing relevant government officers and 
using them to ensure that the members of the intended 
cooperative do not meet. These moves, including those 
taken by the YFCS did not assess why the fishermen 
wanted to move out of the existing cooperative union. 
Indeed the both YFCS and the LSFP know the benefits 
of association and inherent potential of collective action 
and needed to have responded positively to the 
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fishermen's move. But because this move was a threat to 
their interest, they could not give it support. 
The thwarting of the fishermen's effort to form a parallel 
association is another apparent problematic aspect of 
collective efficiency. It implies that in cases where there 
are competing interests, joint action may be very difficult 
to realise for all the competing interests. This is largely 
because the competing interests are not at par in relation 
to resources and the political networks each is able to 
rally. The case becomes more complicated in cases where 
authorities charged with responsibility of managing a 
resource and supporting prevailing interest groups are 
partisan and subscribe to particular interest group(s). 
The second unequal power relations is seen in the 
progressive trader (ref: Box 1). Apart from the road and 
u^caofunuf lunuenee on patrol ot tlie Lake, other 
interventions the trader makes are for personal gains. For 
example, only his fish is allowed to land on his EU 
certified landing shed. Whereas, majority of traders and 
fishermen do not have any formal arrangement with large 
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scale fish processors, he has three formal arrangements 
and is a middle man for some fishermen and traders. 
Although his vertical link with the LSFP has indirect 
spill over effect to other enterprises within the cluster, 
the extent of unequal power relations make it hard to 
realise joint action. 
The self-interest approach of the progressive trader has 
both positive and negative effects on the cluster. The 
development of an acceptable well equipped banda by 
the trader in collaboration with one LSFP, has made the 
cluster retain its portion of the export market; by 
attracting more LSFP to the cluster. However, the 
restricted use of the development is not positive to other 
traders and artisanal fishermen, who still have to use a 
comparatively poor banda. 
The fishermen have no formal arrangement with the 
LSFP and have to deal with medium scale Fish traders 
[who use pick ups for collecting fish) through their 
agents located at the cooperative banda. The prices 
offered to fishermen by these traders and consumers are 
75 
IDSAVP No. 519 
lower than those offered by the LSFP to the progressive 
trader. The progressive trader is contented with pricing 
which he directly negotiates with senior officials of LSFP 
firms in Kisumu. Consequently, it is not in his interest to 
press for steady and good prices for fish from the cluster. 
This is a role which the cooperative and other actors 
have to take up, if they are make more gains from the 
fishing activities based at the cluster. 
One bottleneck to joint action from other actors in 
Uhanya lies in the fact that groups are not organised 
around businesses but welfare associations which have 
very little to do with business. It is only the LSFP and 
the progressive trader who have harnessed the economic 
gains, whereas the other interest groups such as 
fishermen and artisanal fish processors are harnessing 
social gains. This is reflected in the many welfare 
groupings existing within the cluster. These groupings 
have not transcended welfare concerns into economic 
realm and their potential of taking joint action based on 
economic gains is doubtful. 
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In conclusion, collective efficiency has been developed as 
an economic theory and, as such, provides useful insights 
into the dynamics of clusters like Kenya's Lake Victoria 
fish industry. Economics, however, does not tell the 
whole story. Assessing the ability of a cluster to respond 
to external shocks and to provide continuing livelihoods 
to all participants requires understanding the politics of 
joint action as well. 
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NOTES 
1 This paper is one of the outputs of the Kenyan 
portion of a larger project on Collective 
Efficiency and Small-scale Industry, directed by 
Hubert Schmitz of the Institute of Development 
Studies at the University of Sussex, and funded 
by the Department for International Development, 
London. Dorothy McCormick, coordinator for the 
Kenya team provided needed input for shaping 
this paper. 
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